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This paper examines the relationship between the quality of accountings earnings and long-run 
performance for South African acquirers in the context of market-to-book value classifications. 
Glamour acquirers show significant earnings momentum prior to acquisition; however this 
momentum is not sustainable. In the period after the acquisition glamour acquirers exhibit a 
decreasing earnings trend and it is found that South African value acquirers outperform value 
acquirer’s post-acquisition. This paper does not however identify the determinant of this 
phenomenon as the hypothesis that the pre-acquisition earnings momentum of glamour acquirers is 
in part bolstered by their aggressive investments is rejected. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the major objectives and themes of this study. The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents an overview of this study.  Section 1.3 gives the 
major problem statement. Section 1.4 outlines the research questions. Section 1.5 provides 
the research objectives and desired outcomes. Section 1.6 explains the limitations identified 
in completing this study. 
1.2 Overview 
Mergers and acquisitions are important events in the life of corporations. The effects for 
shareholders have been extensively studied. A general result is that the shareholders of 
target firms earn positive and significant returns, whereas returns for acquiring firms are 
much lower and possibly negative (Gonenc and Plantinga, 2007).  
This study seeks to investigate the link between the poor quality of the earnings of high 
market to book value acquirers (defined as a glamour acquirer) pre-acquisition with its 
operating underperformance relative to low market-to-book value acquirers (value 
acquirer) post acquisition in the South African economy.  This study will define criteria that 
characterises glamour/value acquirers, poor earnings quality and pre/post acquisition, and 
apply these criteria to South African mergers and acquisitions as well as identify and 
measure long-run performance. 
Existing research has shown that some acquiring firms earn negative abnormal stock returns 
after mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s), with the poor performance mainly associated with 
“glamour” acquirers (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).   
Glamour acquirers are those firms that are highly valued as a result of their prior market 
performance. Their stocks receive premium ratings in the form of a high market to book 
value ratio. In contrast firms with a low market to book value rating are undervalued but 
have the potential for subsequent value gains (value acquirers). Glamour stocks are high 
growth and value stocks are low growth (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  
 Using a sample of 797 South African acquisitions from 2001 to 2009, I find that glamour 
acquirers have a significant upward trend in earnings (measured by different accounting 
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components of earnings) in the three years leading up to the acquisition. This upward trend 
peaks at the time of the acquisition and there is a downward trend in earnings in the years 
following the acquisition. Prior valuations of acquirers matters. Overvalued acquirers are 
more likely to make acquisitions. Temporary overvaluation, if not fully adjusted for by the 
market during the initial merger process, will be corrected eventually and will appear as 
negative long-term abnormal returns. (Ang, Cheng and Nagel, 2008) 
 I observe using BHR abnormal returns that South African value acquirers outperform 
glamour acquirers in the long-run post-acquisition.  
Firms that are valued too high relative to their fundamental value find it easier to bid higher 
prices for acquisitions. In particular there is evidence that investor overvaluation of 
acquirers fuels takeover activity (Gonenc and Plantinga, 2007). 
This study, as in Zhu (2008) hypothesises that the above mentioned trend in glamour 
acquirer earnings is due to the fact that the pre-acquisition earnings momentum is 
bolstered by an unsustainable earnings component. The measure of earnings stability used 
in this study is based on the difference between residual income and earnings and is used to 
detect the presence of aggressive investments for the purpose to increasing earnings and 
thus the share price. I found that analysis of the data however proved inconclusive in 
proving that the pre-acquisition earnings momentum of glamour acquirers is in part 
bolstered by their aggressive investments.  
The remainder of this study is organised as such: Chapter 2 gives a brief review of studies 
that are pertinent to this study and of literature on relevant themes and concepts. Chapter 
3 outlines the data sample used as well as a breakdown of the methodology used to conduct 
this analysis. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the results this paper. Chapter 5 provides 
conclusions and recommendations. Chapter 6 gives the references. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
South Africa has seen a rapid increase in mergers & acquisitions activity since 1994. 
However there remains very little empirical evidence surrounding the long term 
performance of South African mergers & acquisitions. This paper seeks to shed some light 
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on the details and cause of post-acquisition earnings phenomena in South African mergers 
& acquisitions. 
1.4 Research Question 
1. Do South African glamour acquirers experience a larger earnings run-up than value 
acquirers in the years before an acquisition? 
  
2. Is the pre-acquisition earnings momentum of South African glamour investors 
bolstered mainly by unsustainable earnings components? 
 
3. What is the relationship between the pre-acquisition earnings momentum of an 
acquirer in South Africa and its long-run performance post-acquisition? 
1.5 Research objectives and expected contribution 
This study seeks to investigate the link between the poor quality of earnings momentum of 
a glamour acquirer pre-acquisition with its operating underperformance relative to value 
acquirers post acquisition in the South African economy.  This study will define criteria that 
characterises poor earnings quality and apply these criteria to the glamour and value 
acquirers of South African mergers and acquisitions. 
The research carried out in this study will be useful to accounting regulatory bodies as well 
as institutional and private investors in gauging the role that the quality of earnings 
momentum and reporting has on share value in a mergers and acquisitions context. 
This paper contributes to the literature on earnings momentum surrounding major 
corporate events and the literature on earnings management.  
1.6 Limitations 
In carrying out this research for the South African context, the availability of comprehensive 
data is a problem.  In addition, there are much fewer mergers and acquisitions taking place 
in South Africa relative to the U.S and the U.K, thus the time line of the sample data must be 
extended. However, since earnings data is needed three years prior to the acquisition as 
well as three years after the acquisition, acquiring an appropriate sample period will be very 
important. The fact that there are vastly different periods of financial and political periods in 
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South Africa’s history, adds to this difficulty. Further difficulty arises due to an increase in 
political and socially motivated transactions (Black Economic Empowerment deals etc.) 
brought about by the introduction of democracy in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the extent of literature on mergers and acquisitions and related 
subjects. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents evidence of studies that 
are similar in nature and objective to this study but use data from different countries. 
Section 2.3 gives literary insights into major themes that are found throughout this paper. 
Section 2.4 gives a summary of the literature review as well as the rationale behind the 
structure of this study. Section 2.5 presents the hypothesis development of this study. 
2.2 Evidence from other countries 
The four studies below are most similar to this study and formed the basis of the 
hypothesis, methodology and reasoning used in this study. 
2.2.1 UK Evidence: Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001) 
Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001) investigated the performance of acquirers both 
in the short and long run and whether short- and long- run performance of acquirers is 
dependent on their status as glamour or value acquirers (measured by market-to-book 
value ratio and price-to-earnings ratio). They found using a sample of 543 U.K acquirers 
during 1983-1995 that shareholders of acquirers with low market to book value experience 
greater abnormal returns than shareholders of acquirers with high market to book value 
over a three year period following an acquisition regardless of how they financed their 
acquisitions.   
They further studied the effect of different acquirer type (defined by financial status and 
their payment method) on their performance in terms of abnormal returns. Their main goal 
was to test the effect of method of payment on long and short run success.  The results 
strongly favoured the extrapolation hypothesis as opposed to the method of payment 
hypothesis. The method of payment hypothesis proposes that managers are motivated to 
increase the stockholder value by acquiring relatively under-valued companies using their 
own stock as payment when their stocks are over-valued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). The 
extrapolation hypothesis proposes that acquirers commanding a market rating due to their 
recent past performance (glamour acquirers) may act out of confidence or hubris in making 
acquisitions. The stocks of such companies may also be overvalued. The managers may be 
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aware of such overvaluation but the stock market is not. The acquirer managers capitalise 
on this information asymmetry but over time on the post-acquisition period the 
overvaluation is corrected and the glamour stocks are rated down leading to significant 
value decline (Rau and Vermaelen, 1997). 
2.2.2 US Evidence (1980 – 1991): Rau and Vermaelen (1997) 
Rau and Vermaelen (1997) found using 3169 U.S mergers and 348 tender U.S. offers that 
acquirers in mergers underperform in the three years after the acquisition. They also 
conclude that the long-term underperformance of acquiring firms in mergers is not uniform 
across firms and that is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition performance of 
low book to market glamour acquirers. Rau and Vermaelen (1997) examined three 
hypotheses: the performance extrapolation hypothesis, the means of payment hypothesis, 
and the earnings per share (EPS) myopia hypothesis as possible reasons for this conclusion. 
Their research concludes that underperformance of glamour acquirers relative to value 
acquirers is attributed to the performance extrapolation hypothesis i.e. the market over-
extrapolates the past performance of the bidder management when it assesses the benefits 
of an acquisition decision. As a result, the market overestimates the ability of the glamour 
bidder to manage other companies. At the same time, the market tends to be overly 
pessimistic about the managerial capacities of bidders with poor past performance (value 
firms). In some ways, the market fails to understand that past managerial performance is 
not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, at least in the case of acquisitions 
(Rau and Vermaelen, 1997).  
 
In contrast to this study which examines poor quality of accounting earning (due mainly to 
increase in negative net present value or value decreasing investments), Rau and Vermaelen 
(1997) look at the distinction between long run price behaviour in mergers and tender 
offers.  
2.2.3 US Evidence (1990 – 2005): Zhu (2008) 
Using data from 1850 M&A of companies listed on U.S Stock Exchanges from 1990-2005 Zhu 
(2008) found that the underperformance of glamour acquirers’ stock is partially driven by 
investors’ failure to recognize the poor earnings quality of glamour acquirers until after the 
acquisition and the reversal of operating performance has been observed.  She found that 
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glamour acquirers have higher market to book values than value acquirers in the build up to 
the acquisition; however they exhibit lower earnings quality. Earnings quality was tested 
using three measures; increasing investments without covering costs of capital, inflating 
accruals, and delaying the recognition of core expenses.  All of these measures allow firms 
to grow earnings that cannot be sustained in the long run (Zhu, 2008). 
2.2.4 Greek Evidence (2001-2003): Georgopoulos, Koumanakos and Siriopoulos (2005) 
Georgopoulos, Koumanakos and Siriopoulos (2005) investigated whether 47 Athens Stock 
Exchange listed acquiring firms from 2001-2003 tend to manipulate accounting earnings 
upwards in the period before the transaction. The proxy for accounting manipulation used is 
discretionary current accruals. Their study concludes that discretionary current accruals 
grow before the offering, peak in the offering year, and decline thereafter and that this 
accruals pattern is mirrored by net operating income in each of the periods. They compute 
total accrual as the change in non-cash working capital less total depreciation expense. 
 
In summation, of the four related studies only Zhu (2008) attributed the post-acquisition 
underperformance of glamour acquirers (relative to value acquirers) to the poor quality of 
glamour acquirers’ earnings momentum in the period prior to the acquisition.  Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) attribute this anomaly to the performance extrapolation hypothesis and 
Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001) sight market over reaction as the cause. 
Georgopoulos, Koumanakos and Siriopoulos (2005) found evidence of accounting 
manipulation in acquirers, but they did not use the glamour or value classification. 
2.3 Literature on Relevant Themes 
The following is a collection of literature findings relating to the major themes that are 
pertinent to this study. 
2.3.1 The Classification as a Glamour/Value Acquirer 
This study seeks to explain the long-term earnings phenomenon empirically associated with 
glamour and value acquirers. The following section outlines the literature surrounding the 
financial classification of glamour and value as well as the proxies that are used to form this 
distinction.  
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2.3.1.1 Glamour versus Value  
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995); Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) have all classified firms with relatively low market-to-book value 
ratios as value firms and those with high market to book firms as glamour firms. Fama & 
French (1992); Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen (1995) and Pontiff & Schall (1998) found 
that when evaluating the performance of firms, a relevant classification for firms is whether 
they are glamour or value firms. 
Glamour acquirers are those firms that are highly valued as a result of their prior market 
performance. Their stocks receive premium ratings in the form of a high market-to-book 
value ratio. In contrast firms with a low market-to-book value rating are undervalued but 
have the potential for subsequent value gains (value acquirers). Glamour stocks are high 
growth and value stocks are low growth. Glamour bidders are more likely to make value-
decreasing takeover decisions than value bidders are in the long run (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998). 
 
A lot of the literature on glamour versus book value and mergers and acquisitions relate to 
the acquirers glamour/value status and the resultant choice of method of payment. Martin 
(1996) found that stock offers are more likely for acquirers with high growth opportunities 
and high acquisition stock returns. Kohers, Kohers and Kohers (2006) found that specifically, 
in cash offers, tender offers are less likely for glamour targets, while in stock offers, glamour 
acquirers are less inclined to make tender offers.  
2.3.1.2 Market-to-Book Value Ratio 
Fama and French (1992) found that the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME) along 
with market equity (ME) capture much of the cross-section of average stock returns by 
looking at six portfolios formed on ranked values of size and BE/ME for individual stocks. 
They concluded that BE/ME is related to persistent properties of earnings i.e. low BE/ME is 
typical of firms with high average returns on capital, whereas high BE/ME is typical of firms 
that are relatively distressed.  
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In their paper, Fama and French (1992) also highlighted the results of Penman (1991) that 
low book-to-market equity firms remain more profitable than high book-to-market firms for 
at least five years after portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market. 
2.3.1.3 Methods of Payment 
The method of payment may signal valuable information to the market with regards to the 
valuation of the common stock. This is because bidding firms’ managers will finance 
acquisitions in the most profitable way for existing shareholders to take advantage of 
information that is not fully reflected in the pre-acquisition stock price (Travlos, 1987). 
Myers and Majluf (1984); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) found that managers will 
prefer a cash offer if they believe that the common stock price of the firm is undervalued, 
while a common stock exchange offer will be preferred if they believe that the common 
stock price of the firm is overvalued. 
Fishman (1984) attributed acquisition payment choice to asymmetric information and the 
threat of competitive bidding. Bidders have greater incentives to finance using stock when 
the asymmetric information about target assets is high (Fishman, 1984).   
2.3.2 The Earnings Momentum around M&A Transactions 
2.3.2.1 Long-Term Merger and Acquisition Performance 
Literature on merger and acquisition performance focuses primarily on economic 
benchmarks even though managers describe a complex set of motives for acquisitions. This 
stems from reasoning that the managers’ motives may be inappropriate, or the managers 
themselves foolhardy and that special deal-specific definitions of success, limit generalising 
from research findings. 
Bruner (2001) concluded that the aggregate, abnormal returns to buyer shareholders from 
M&A activity are essentially zero.  Bruner (2001) compiled a database of studies that 
examine the returns to various stakeholders of mergers and acquisitions. The table, that is 
most relevant to this study is the returns to the acquiring firm’s shareholders, is presented 
in the Table 1 below: 
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Table 1 
Summary of Shareholder Return Studies for M&A: Returns to Acquiring Firm Shareholders 
Studies Reporting Long-Term Returns to Acquirers 
Source: Bruner. R. F., (2001). Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker.  
Bruner (2001) compiled the following summary of the findings of 41 studies. With regards to 
the returns to the buyer firm, he found that 20 studies report negative returns with 13 of 
the 20 significantly negative. On the other hand 24 studies report positive returns with 17 of 
the 24 significantly positive. In short, the findings are distributed rather evenly: one-third 
(13) show value destruction; one third show value conservation (14); and one-third show 
value creation (17). Eleven studies consider returns well after the consummation of the 
transaction. Eight studies report negative and significant returns. The studies show a slight 
tendency for returns to decline over time. 
Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992) in considering 41 studies wrote that on average, 
shareholders of bidding or acquiring firms do not realize significant returns from mergers 
and acquisitions. Magenheim and Mueller (1988) found that the stock market performance 
of the acquiring firms deteriorated over a 60-month period after the acquisition. 
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2.3.3 The Quality of Earnings Momentum of Acquirers 
2.3.3.1 Earnings Momentum Quality 
Earnings manipulation refers to choosing accounting procedures to meet a specific goal. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005); Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) both found using 
survey evidence that managers seek to manage earnings to beat earnings benchmarks 
because the equity market provides sufficient incentives for outperforming benchmarks. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), in order to exploit relatively high equity valuations, 
managers tend to engage in equity-based transactions like stock-based acquisitions. 
Managers are likely to manage earnings to avoid the costs associated with reporting poor 
results even if the lower growth is not a result of poor management. The managers hope 
that the company’s performance will turn around allowing the company to absorb the 
effects of aggressive accounting choices. If the company’s performance does not turn 
around, the managers may find themselves engaging in more aggressive accounting choices 
(Myers, Myers and Skinner, 2006). 
Easterwood (1998); Erickson and Wang (1999) have cited evidence of earnings management 
in takeovers and stock for stock mergers. Erickson and Wang (1999) also found that 
correlation between the acquiring firm’s share price and the use of shares in transactions 
increases the incentives for acquiring firms to attempt to increasing accounting earnings 
through manipulation. Louis (2004) reported that in the quarter preceding stock swap 
announcements, acquiring firms report significant positive abnormal accruals. 
2.3.3.2 Residual Income 
In their study, Balachandran and Mohanram (2008) showed that net income can be 
decomposed into an organic growth component, an investment-driven growth component 
and other components (which they attributed to changes in risks and interest expense). 
They concluded that residual income can be used to separate growth in profits into organic 
growth from existing investments and growth driven by new investments. It was also 
concluded that growth in accounting profits alone is incomplete and is not truly reflective of 
economic performance. Balachandran and Mohanram (2008) also found that the market 
over-reacts to (new) investment driven growth and under-reacts to organic growth. 
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Organic growth in earnings, which is often proxied by the change in residual income, is 
considered to be highly valuable to the market as it has the highest correlation with stock 
returns. This suggests that the market considers organic growth to be more sustainable than 
investment-driven growth (Balachandran and Mohanram, 2008). 
2.3.3.3 Stock market driven acquisitions theory 
Ang and Cheng (2006) found that the probability of a firm becoming a stock acquirer 
increases significantly with its degree of overvaluation.  
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) presented a model of stock-market-driven acquisitions and found 
that there is a strong incentive for firms to get their equity overvalued so that they can 
make acquisitions with stock. They also found that firms with overvalued equity might be 
able to make acquisitions, survive, and grow, while firms with undervalued, or relatively less 
overvalued, equity become takeover targets themselves. 
 
One of the incentives for companies to raise their stock price even through earnings 
manipulation is the benefit of having a high valuation for making acquisitions (D’Avolio, 
Gildor and Shleifer, 2001). 
2.4 Study Structure 
Zhu (2008) has vastly influenced the methodology and objectives of this study. An analysis 
of the literature has allowed me to understand and interpret the task at hand and allowed 
me to tailor my methodology to best suit South African acquirers and the South African 
market. This leads to the following framework for this piece of research.  
2.4.1 Market to Book Value 
In classifying the acquirer as glamour or value, this study uses market to book value as the 
appropriate proxy as opposed to price-to-earnings ratio or both.  This is because Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) found that underperformance of the acquiring firms’ stock is mainly 
driven by high market-to-book value acquirers and this study intends to test (amongst 
others) the hypothesis that market-to-book value standing affects post acquisition 
performance of acquirers. Another factor contributing to the use of market to book value as 
a proxy is that Fama and French (1992) concluded that market to book value is related to 
persistent properties of earnings.  
15 
 
2.4.2 Accounting Earnings Choice 
As per Zhu (2008) this study uses net income and earnings before interest, tax, amortisation 
and depreciation (EBITDA) as the measures of accounting earnings for acquirers. According 
to Zhu (2008) the use of EBITDA is advantageous because it excludes the effects of 
depreciation, goodwill, interest expenses and taxes. This ensures that it unaffected by the 
accounting method for the M&A transaction as well as the method of financing.  
2.4.3 Residual Income 
This study relies on the residual income as the sole factor in determining the organic 
component of earnings because Balachandran and Mohanram (2008) conclude that residual 
income can be used to separate growth in profits into organic growth from existing 
investments and growth driven by new investments. It was also concluded that growth in 
accounting profits alone is incomplete and is not truly reflective of economic performance. 
2.4.4 Performance Calculation and Benchmarks 
The benchmark index used in this study measure long term performance is the JSE All Share 
Index because the sample of acquirers is taken from all sectors of the JSE main board. The 
measure of return used is abnormal stock performance, which is proxied by the excess 
return of a stock over the return of the JSE All Share Index. This study focuses on only BHR 
to gauge the extent to which glamour acquirers share price corrects after the acquisition, 
because this type of returns is the most relevant for investors (Zhu, 2008). 
2.5 Summary of Major Differences from Other Studies 
2.5.1 UK Evidence: Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001) 
This study differs from Sudarsanam, et al (2001) in that first, they use two proxies (price-to-
earnings ratio and market-to-book value ratio) to determine whether an acquirer is glamour 
or value, whereas this study only uses market to book value as a proxy. Second, 
Sudarsanam, et al (2001) explore how the method of payment explains the 
underperformance amongst glamour acquirers whereas this study looks at the role of poor 
earnings quality in long run glamour acquirer underperformance. Third, Sudarsanam, et al 
(2001) analyses UK data as opposed to South African data which this study utilises. Lastly, 
Sudarsanam, et al (2001) use price-to-earnings ratios, rates of return and other benchmark 
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models as the measure of earnings to determine if glamour acquirers underperform value 
acquirers and this study uses share price data. 
2.5.2 US Evidence (1980 – 1991): Rau and Vermaelen (1997) 
In contrast to this study which examines poor quality of accounting earning (due mainly to 
increase in negative net present value or value decreasing investments), Rau and Vermaelen 
(1997) look at the distinction between long run price behaviour in mergers and tender 
offers.  
2.5.3 US Evidence (1990 – 2005): Zhu (2008) 
The Zhu (2008) study forms the basis for the methodology of this study with the following 
exceptions: First, Zhu (2008) examines the earnings sustainability of both acquirers and 
targets whereas this study only considered acquirers when considering the sustainability of 
earnings. Second, Zhu (2008) focused on three measures of earnings quality, namely: 
increasing investments without covering costs of capital, inflating accruals, and delaying the 
recognition of core expenses, all of which allow firms to grow earnings that cannot be 
sustained in the long run. This study only focuses on increasing investments without 
covering cost of capital as a measure of earnings quality. Third, Zhu (2008) uses Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Buy and Hold Returns (BHR) to test the reversal of earnings 
momentum in acquirers.  
2.5.4 Greek Evidence (2001-2003): Georgopoulos, Koumanakos and Siriopoulos (2005) 
In contrast to this study, Georgopoulos, Koumanakos and Siriopoulos (2005) do not consider 
the status of an acquirer as glamour or value, the data they use is of Greek acquirers and the 
proxy for accounting manipulation used is discretionary current accruals.  
2.6 Hypothesis Development 
Three major themes are addressed in this paper: The earnings momentum around M&A 
transactions, the quality of the earnings momentum of acquirers and the long-term stability 
of the pre-acquisition earning momentum of acquirers.  
Formally these themes lead to the formulation of three hypotheses. 
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2.6.1 The Earnings Momentum around M&A Transactions 
Ho: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, 
peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in the years after 
the acquisition. 
Ha: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibit no trend. 
2.6.2 The Quality of the Earnings Momentum of Acquirers 
Ho: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers pre-
acquisition earnings supports the claim that glamour acquirers’ pre-acquisition earnings are 
unsustainable. 
Ha: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings does not give any indication of the sustainability of glamour acquirers 
pre-acquisition earnings. 
2.6.3 The Long-term Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirers 
Ho: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the 
abnormal stock performance of glamour acquirers post-acquisition. 
Ha: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline does not affect 
the abnormal stock performance of glamour acquirers post-acquisition. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology and data used in this study.  The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the data selection criteria, data transformations 
as well as the different sources used to obtain data. Section 3.3 outlines the testable 
hypotheses within the study as well as the process followed to test them. Section 3.4 
summaries the chapter. 
3.2 Data and Data Source 
The M&A data is obtained from the Ernst and Young (E&Y) M&A database. The sample is 
selected using the following criteria: (1) a M&A deal is announced between January 1, 1994 
and December 31, 2009; (2) the acquiring firms are publicly listed and traded on the JSE; (3) 
the mode of the deals is a 100% acquisition. These criteria yield a sample of 797 deals. 
Due to the nature of this analysis and the need for share price data 3 years before and after 
the deal (and the availability of such data), the sample period was restated as being 
between January 1, 2001 and December 31 2009. In the case of the same acquirer having 
multiple deals during the same calendar year, the largest deal was used in the sample. 
Financial Institutions (high leverage ratios) were excluded from the data sample. High 
leverage ratios distort operating performance measures and these firms are closely 
regulated, which may constrain their ability to invest and to manipulate accruals. The 
sample acquirers were required to have market-to-book value (MTBV) data available in the 
quarter preceding the deal announcement as well accounting earnings data available for 
three years before and after the deal announcement. Market value (MV) and book value 
(BV) data for each of the acquirers is obtained in the quarter preceding the announcement 
of each deal via Bloomberg. These additional filters reduced the sample size to 404 deals. 
The first step in this study is to analyse the value that the market places on an acquiring 
company as opposed to its historic or book value and use this information to classify 
acquirers. Fama and French (1992) found that the ratio of market equity to book equity 
captured much of the variability of stock returns.  MV is a market consistent financial 
variable and is calculated by multiplying a company’s share price and its number of 
outstanding shares. The BV of a company is an accounting figure and it is obtained from the 
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financial reports of a company.  Using these two measures of company value each acquirer’s 
market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio is calculated as such: 
 
This allowed the classification of the acquirer as either glamour (high market-to-book value) 
or value (low market-to-book value). Glamour acquirers are those firms that are highly 
valued as a result of their prior market performance. Their stocks receive premium ratings in 
the form of a high market to book value ratio. In contrast firms with a low market to book 
value rating are undervalued but have the potential for subsequent value gains (value 
acquirers) (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). 
Acquiring firms are separated by the year of their acquisition and ranked by their MTBV. As 
per the Zhu (2008) study the top quintile of acquirers of each year is classified as glamour 
acquirers and the bottom quintile is classified value acquirers. This results in populations of 
52 value acquirers and 52 glamour acquirers. 
The analysis makes use of various accounting data. These include net income; earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA); investments, total assets and 
net operating profit after tax (NOPAT). This accounting data is sourced from McGregor BFA. 
The interest rate data, which includes R157 yields, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
estimates and cost of debt rates, is obtained from McGregor BFA. Share price data and the 
JSE All Share Index price data is used in portions of the analysis. This data is obtained from I-
Net Bridge. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 The Earnings Momentum around M&A Transactions 
Ho: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, 
peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in the years after 
the acquisition. 
Ha: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibit no trend. 
One of the main tests of the paper is to compare the performance of glamour acquirers and 
value acquirers three years before and three years after acquisitions.  Gilchrist, Himmelberg 
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and Huberman (2005) have shown that research on asset prices is increasingly sympathetic 
to the idea that stock price bubbles are possible. 
The measures of earnings used are net income and earnings before interest, tax, 
amortisation and depreciation (EBITDA). As implemented by (Zhu, 2008), earnings measure 
were standardised by the total assets of each acquirer. This study examines the long term 
actions and performance of acquirers, and as per (Zhu, 2008); the earnings of the acquirers 
three years before and after the acquisition are examined. This involves creating the 
variable subscripts; Year (–3), Year (–2), Year (–1), Year (+1), Year (+2), Year (+3) which 
represent the variables of each acquirer in both populations (Glamour and Value) exactly 1, 
2 and 3 year before and after the acquisition. 
As in Zhu (2008) study, the time period naming convention is as such: 
Year (0) - last fiscal year before the deal announcement 
Year (1) - first fiscal year after deal completion…and so on 
The period between the deal announcement and the deal completion is not considered in 
the sample due to the speculative volatility during this period (Zhu, 2008). 
By examining the earnings trend of acquirer’s pre and post-acquisition it is possible to gain 
valuable insight into how the acquirer’s earnings behave around the acquisition. In order to 
examine the long-term trend in the earnings the mean value for net income (Y – 3) - (Y + 3), 
turnover (Y – 3) - (Y + 3) and operating profit (Y – 3) - (Y + 3) for glamour and value acquirers 
is calculated. This allows an examination of the difference in earning trends for glamour and 
value acquirers in the years preceding and following the acquisition. The mean value for 
each year of glamour and value acquirers is found in order to examine the trend. 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if glamour acquirers have increases in their 
earnings in the period before the deal and if so, if there is an opposite result in the period 
after the deal as found by Zhu (2008) using US acquirers. 
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3.3.2 The Quality of Earnings Momentum of Acquirers 
Ho: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings supports the claim that glamour acquirers pre-acquisition earnings are 
unsustainable. 
Ha: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings does not give any indication of the sustainability of glamour acquirers 
pre-acquisition earnings. 
In their study, Balachandran and Mohanram (2008) showed that net income can be 
decomposed into an organic growth component, an investment-driven growth component 
and other components (which they attributed to changes in risks and interest expense). 
They concluded that residual income can be used to separate growth in profits into organic 
growth from existing investments and growth driven by new investments and that growth in 
accounting profits alone is incomplete and is not truly reflective of economic performance. 
The measure of earnings stability used in this study is based on the difference between the 
trends in reported earnings and residual earnings as in Zhu (2008). In deriving earnings from 
investments, accrual accounting does not recognize the cost of equity capital raised to 
acquire the assets. Hence, a firm can show positive earnings growth in the short run simply 
by increasing investments as long as the return from incremental investment exceeds the 
amortized costs. By contrast, since residual earnings are obtained by charging the cost of 
capital against earnings, it has a built-in safeguard against short run earnings growth 
induced by increasing investment. Therefore, a comparison of earnings with residual 
earnings can identify earnings growth resulting from increasing investment that does not 
cover the cost of capital (Zhu, 2008).  
In order to determine if the acquirers have increased their investments in order to boost 
income in the years prior to their acquisition, each acquirers investment figure is examined 
for each of the three years before and after the acquisition. Following the naming 
convention adopted above, the investment for every acquirer in the Glamour/Value sample 
for 1, 2 and 3 year before and after the acquisition is obtained and standardised by the total 
assets of each acquirer. The mean value of investment for each year of glamour and value 
acquirers is calculated and the trend examined. 
22 
 
The next step is to analyse the trend in residual income of the glamour acquirers and 
compare it to the glamour acquirer’s trend in mean net income. Residual Income is 
calculated as follows:  
 
NOPATt  = Net operating profit adding back after tax interest expense at time t 
WACCt  = Weighted average cost of capital at time t  
Following the naming convention adopted above, the residual income is calculated, as per 
the above formula, for every glamour acquirer for the each of the three years before and 
after the acquisition.  The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) estimates are obtained 
from McGregor BFA. 
3.3.3 The Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirers 
Ho: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the 
abnormal stock performance of glamour acquirers post-acquisition. 
Ha: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline does not affect 
the abnormal stock performance of glamour acquirers post-acquisition. 
The goal of this test to evaluate the extent to which the earnings momentum prior to 
acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the abnormal stock performance of merged 
firms. Post-acquisition is defined in this study as the three years following an acquisition. 
Year -1 provides an indication of any increase in abnormal returns due to the positive 
earnings momentum pre-acquisition. Year +1 to Year +3 give inferences into any reversal of 
stock performance due to a decline in earnings. The benchmark index used is the JSE All 
Share Index because the sample of acquirers is taken from all sectors of the JSE main board. 
The measure of return used is abnormal stock performance, which is proxied by the excess 
return of a stock over the return of the JSE All Share Index. Buy and hold” (BHR) returns are 
used to examine the abnormal stock performance of the acquirers. 
The BHR of stock prices for glamour and value acquirers is labelled “Raw” returns. The BHR 
returns are calculated via the formula: 
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rit is the raw returns on firm i in month t 
The BHR for the JSE All Share Index are calculated in a similar manner. The abnormal return 
is calculated as the BHR for each acquirer minus the BHR of the JSE All Share Index for Year -
1 and each of the three years after the acquisition (Year +1, Year +2 and Year +3). 
3.4 Summary 
Accounting, interest rate, share price and M&A deal information is combined using 
methodology and statistical techniques gathered from numerous related studies to attempt 
to answer the following three questions.   
First, do glamour acquirer’s earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, 
peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in the years after 
the acquisition? 
Second, does the organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour 
acquirers pre-acquisition earnings supports the claim that glamour acquirer’s pre-
acquisition earnings are unsustainable?  
Third, does the earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline affect the 
abnormal stock performance of glamour acquirers’ post-acquisition? 
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CHAPTER 4 – Presentation of Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the results of the analysis within this study, namely the results of the 
test of the three hypotheses.  The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 showcases 
the descriptive statistics surrounding the data samples used in this study. Section 4.3 
presents the results of the main hypothesis tests identified by the study.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 797 completed 100% acquisitions by JSE listed companies from 01 
January 2001 to 31 December 2009, which are documented on E&Y M&A Database. The 
deals are sorted by acquisition year and ordered by acquirer’s market-to-book value. The 
top quintile (highest market-to-book value) of acquirers for each year is labelled “glamour” 
acquirers and the bottom quintile (lowest market-to-book value) is labelled “value” 
acquirers. This process yields a sample of 52 value acquirers and 52 glamour acquirers. 
Table 1 below showcases the various properties of the data. Panel A reports, by 
announcement year, number of acquisitions made by glamour and value acquirers, the 
mean values of the deals the percentage of deals made by glamour and value acquirers. 
Panel B reports the mean characteristics of value and glamour acquirers at the end of fiscal 
year preceding the deal announcement date. Panel C reports the industry distribution of 
glamour and value acquirers. The industry classifications correspond to JSE Exchange 
sectors. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Acquisition by Announcement Year 
  Number  of Acquirers   Average Deal Value (Rmil) 
Year Value Glamour   Value Glamour 
2009 6 6 
 
781.63 229.12 
2008 8 8 
 
102.56 182.25 
2007 0 0 
 
0.00 0.00 
2006 8 8 
 
317.45 376.38 
2005 8 8 
 
32.01 189.60 
2004 5 5 
 
92.60 60.20 
2003 5 5 
 
30.12 2083.00 
2002 7 7 
 
9.71 7773.37 
2001 5 5 
 
10.68 63.95 
 
52 52   152.97 1217.54 
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Panel B: The characteristics of glamour and value acquirers 
  Value Glamour 
Acquirers' assets (R mil) 132,238 231,743 
Acquirer’s market-to-book ratios 0.9 8.8 
Number of observations 52 52 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of acquirers by industry 
Industry Number of Firms 
  Value Glamour 
Auto Parts 1 0 
Beverages 0 1 
Broadcasting Contractors 0 1 
Building & Construction Materials 4 6 
Business Support Services 3 2 
Chemicals - Speciality 0 3 
Computer Hardware 1 1 
Computer Services 11 0 
Containers & Packaging 1 2 
Diversified Industrial 10 1 
Electrical Equipment 2 2 
Engineering - General 1 0 
Food & Drug Retailers 1 5 
Food Processors 1 4 
General Retailers 1 3 
Gold Mining 1 3 
Hotels 1 2 
Household Appliances & Housewares 2 1 
Media Agencies 1 1 
Mining 1 1 
Pharmaceuticals 2 2 
Platinum 1 1 
Rail, Road & Freight 1 3 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 1 1 
Retail 3 3 
Specialised Consumer Services 1 1 
Telecommunications Equipment 0 1 
Wireless Telecom Services 0 1 
 
52 52 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The Earnings Momentum around M&A Transactions  
Ho: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, 
peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in the years after 
the acquisition. 
Panel A below shows the trend analysis of net income/total assets for glamour and value 
acquirers. Net income is the bottom line of profit for a company and gives valuable insight 
into how well a company is performing. Glamour acquirers show an upwards trend in net 
income/total assets for the years preceding the acquisitions, peaking in the year of the 
acquisition followed by a decline in net income/total assets in the years post acquisition. 
This is consistent with the findings of Zhu (2008) that U.S glamour acquirers have increased 
earnings in the years leading up to an acquisition and have decreased earnings in the years 
after. Glamour acquirers’ net income/total assets is 6.09% in Year -3 and rises to 8.73% in 
Year -2, 12.70% in Year -1 and peaks at 12.83% in Year 0. It falls to 11.14% in Year +1, 9.12% 
in Year +2 and 8.93% in Year +3. Value acquirers exhibit no consistent trend in the years 
preceding the acquisition. Net income/total assets is 5.60% in Year -3, 9.21% in Year -2 and 
4.45% in Year -1. Net income/Total assets fall to -5.47% in the year of the acquisition and 
increases steadily in the years post acquisition. The net income/total assets is -5.47% in Year 
+1, -2.68% in Year +2 and 1.90% in Year +3. Glamour acquirers have a higher net 
income/total assets for the entire period before and after the acquisition with the exception 
of Year -2. The size of this difference, on average, changes from 0.49% to 7.03%, reaching a 
minimum of -0.47% in Year -2 and a maximum of 18.61% in Year 0. 
 
    Panel A: Net Income/Total Assets 
  Year Glamour Value Difference t-Stat t-Critical   
  Year + 3 8.93% 1.90% 7.03% -2.87 2.00   
-
  
Year + 2 9.12% -2.68% 11.81% -2.59 2.01   
  Year + 1 11.14% -5.47% 16.61% -2.25 1.99   
  Year 0 12.83% -5.78% 18.61% -2.46 2.00   
  Year - 1 12.70% 4.45% 8.25% -2.39 2.00   
  Year - 2 8.73% 9.21% -0.47% -2.21 2.02   
  Year - 3 6.09% 5.60% 0.49% -0.17 1.99   
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Panel B below shows the trend analysis of EBITDA/total assets for glamour and value   
acquirers. EBITDA is an approximate measure of a company’s operating cash flows based on 
the company’s income statement. Glamour acquirers exhibit a general flat trend in 
EBITDA/total assets for the entire period of analysis. The mean level of EBITDA/total assets 
for glamour acquirers changes from 21.55% in year -3 to 26.90% in Year +3 with minimum 
value 19.62% in Year +1. Value acquirers’ mean EBITDA/total assets changes from 16.45% in 
Year -3 to 12.89% in Year +3 with a minimum value of 6.41% in Year 0 and a maximum of 
20.34% in Year -2.  The mean EBITDA/total assets for glamour acquirers is on average 
greater than that of value acquirers (with the exception of Year -2) with the size of the 
difference, on average, changing from 5.10% to 14.02% reaching a maximum of 18.58% in 
Year 0. 
 
    Panel B: EBITDA/Total Assets 
  Year Glamour Value Difference t-Stat t-Critical   
  Year + 3 26.90% 12.89% 14.02% -3.02 2.01   
  Year + 2 19.85% 10.89% 8.96% -2.23 1.99   
  Year + 1 19.62% 11.70% 7.92% -1.75 2.00   
  Year 0 24.98% 6.41% 18.58% -2.39 2.00   
  Year - 1 26.04% 12.52% 13.52% -3.17 1.99   
  Year - 2 20.02% 20.34% -0.32% 1.22 2.02   
  Year - 3 21.55% 16.45% 5.10% -1.60 2.00   
 
Panel C and D summarise the trend analysis for glamour and value acquirers respectively.  
Glamour acquirers exhibit relatively flat trends for sales, operating income and EBITDA. 
Glamour net income, however exhibits an upward trend in the three years before the 
acquisition, peaking in Year 0 and then follows a downward trend in the three years post-
acquisition.  Value acquirers exhibit no trend for net income. For all measures of earnings 
used, glamour acquirers have higher figures than value acquirers. 
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  Panel C: Glamour Acquirer Summary   
  Year Net Income EBITDA   
  Year + 3 8.93% 26.90%   
  Year + 2 9.12% 19.85%   
  Year + 1 11.14% 19.62%   
  Year 0 12.83% 24.98%   
  Year - 1 12.70% 26.04%   
  Year - 2 8.73% 20.02%   
  Year - 3 6.09% 21.55%   
       Panel D: Value Acquirer Summary   
  Year Net Income EBIDTA   
  Year + 3 1.90% 12.89%   
  Year + 2 -2.68% 10.89%   
  Year + 1 -5.47% 11.70%   
  Year 0 -5.78% 6.41%   
  Year - 1 4.45% 12.52%   
  Year - 2 9.21% 20.34%   
  Year - 3 5.60% 16.45%   
 
Based on the trend of glamour acquirers’ net income/total assets and the fact that for all 
measures of earnings used, glamour acquirers have higher figures than value acquirers the 
null hypothesis that glamour acquirer’s earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an 
upwards trend, peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in 
the years after the acquisition is accepted.  
4.3.2 The Quality of Earnings Momentum of Acquirers 
Ho: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings supports the claim that glamour acquirers pre-acquisition earnings are 
unsustainable. 
Ha: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings does not give any indication of the sustainability of glamour acquirers 
pre-acquisition earnings. 
Panel G below shows the trend analysis of investments/total assets for glamour and value 
acquirers. Investments are recorded at cost (market price). Glamour acquirers exhibit an 
approximately flat trend in investments/total assets for the entire period of analysis. The 
mean level of investments/total assets for glamour acquirers changes from 5.30% in year -3 
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to 7.21% in Year +3 with a minimum of 4.29% in Year +1. Similarly, value acquirers have an 
approximately flat trend from Year -3 to Year +3. Value acquirers mean investments/total 
assets changes from 11.73% in Year -3 to 10.12% Year +3 with a minimum value of 10.12% 
in Year +3 and a maximum of 16.16% in Year +1.  The mean investment/total assets for 
value acquirers is on average greater than that of glamour acquirers with the size of the 
difference (glamour – value), on average, changing from -6.43% in Year -3 to -2.91% in Year 
+3 reaching a minimum of -11.87% in Year +1. The evidence provided in Panel G shows that 
value acquirers have a higher investment to total assets ratio than glamour acquirers. This 
study hypothesises that glamour acquirers invest in negative net present value or value 
destroying investments and makes no inferences into glamour acquirers’ general level of 
investment. The mean level of investments for glamour acquirers does not show a 
substantial upwards trend in the years before the acquisition. 
 
    Panel G: Investments/Total Assets 
  Year Glamour Value Difference t-Stat t-Critical   
  Year + 3 7.21% 10.12% -2.91% 0.89 2.01   
  Year + 2 5.60% 12.36% -6.76% 1.83 2.01   
  Year + 1 4.29% 16.16% -11.87% 2.78 2.03   
  Year 0 6.13% 13.80% -7.67% 1.82 2.01   
  Year - 1 6.90% 12.49% -5.59% 1.29 2.00   
  Year - 2 5.05% 13.42% -8.36% 2.03 2.04   
  Year - 3 5.30% 11.73% -6.43% 1.79 2.03   
 
Panel H below shows the trend analysis of NOPAT/total assets for glamour and value 
acquirers. Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) is operating profit minus the tax expense. 
The mean NOPAT/total assets for glamour acquirers increased steadily in the three year 
preceding the acquisition with 12.66% in Year -3, 14.55% in Year -2 and 19.07% Year -1.  It 
peaks in Year -1 and fall in the year of the acquisition as well as the three year after. Mean 
glamour NOPAT/total assets falls to 18.08% in Year 0, 16.48% in Year +1, 15.11% in Year +2 
and 14.76% in Year +3. Value acquirers mean NOPAT/total assets changes from 14.05% in 
Year -3 to 14.76% in Year +3 with a maximum value of 17.66% in Year -2 and a minimum of 
8.44% in Year +2. The mean difference (glamour – value) in NOPAT/total is positive from 
Year -1 (5.96%) to Year +3 (4.51%). Year -2 and Year -3 are -3.11% and -1.39% respectively. 
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    Panel H: NOPAT/Total Assets 
  Year Glamour Value Difference t-Stat t-Critical   
  Year + 3 14.76% 10.25% 4.51% -2.45 2.00   
  Year + 2 15.11% 8.44% 6.67% -2.06 2.00   
  Year + 1 16.48% 9.28% 7.20% -1.23 1.99   
  Year 0 18.08% 11.38% 6.70% -1.84 2.01   
  Year - 1 19.07% 13.11% 5.96% -2.32 1.99   
  Year - 2 14.55% 17.66% -3.11% 1.26 2.02   
  Year - 3 12.66% 14.05% -1.39% -0.37 2.00   
 
The measure of earnings sustainability used in this study is based on the difference of the 
trends of earnings and residual earnings. “In deriving earnings from investments, accrual 
accounting does not recognize the cost of equity capital raised to acquire the assets. Hence, 
a firm can show positive earnings growth in the short run simply by increasing investments 
as long as the return from incremental investment exceeds the amortized costs,” (Zhu, 
2008, page 2). Panel I below shows the trend analysis of residual income/total assets for 
glamour and value acquirers. The mean residual income/total assets for glamour acquirers 
exhibits no obvious trend. It starts at 5.94% in Year -3 and decreases to 4.53% in Year-2. 
Year -1 sees an increase to 8.3%. There is a decline in Year 0 and Year +1 to 8.07% and 5.07% 
respectively. Year +2 and Year +3 sees an increase to 5.15% and 10.15%. The mean residual 
income/total assets for value acquirers similarly exhibits no informative trend. It changes 
from 2.19% in Year -3 to 0.22% Year +3 with a minimum value of -4.40% in Year -2 and a 
maximum of 3.94% in Year -1. Mean glamour residual income/total assets is on average 
greater than that of value acquirers for the entire time period of the study. The difference 
(glamour – value) is 3.75% in Year -3, which is also the minimum value, and reaches a peak 
at 9.93% in Year +3. 
    Panel I: Residual Income/Total Assets 
  Year Glamour Value Difference t-Stat t-Critical   
  Year + 3 10.15% 0.22% 9.93% -2.37 2.00   
  Year + 2 5.15% -1.27% 6.42% -1.92 2.00   
  Year + 1 5.07% 0.32% 4.74% -1.26 1.99   
  Year 0 8.07% 1.18% 6.89% -2.59 1.99   
  Year - 1 8.30% 3.94% 4.36% -1.73 1.99   
  Year - 2 4.53% -4.40% 8.93% -0.86 2.02   
  Year - 3 5.94% 2.19% 3.75% -1.02 2.00   
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Panel J and K summaries the earnings momentum quality results for glamour and value 
acquirers respectively. The mean level of investments for glamour acquirers also does not 
show a substantial upwards trend in the years before the acquisition. This runs contrary to 
the fact that this study hypothesis that glamour acquirers will bid up their stock price in the 
years prior to acquisition by bolstering their earnings through increased investments. Mean 
glamour NOPAT experiences an upward trend in the three years prior to acquisition, 
peaking in Year -1 and falls in the years post acquisition. This is consistent with this studies 
acceptance of the hypothesis that the earnings that glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to 
value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, peaking just before the acquisition and then 
exhibits a downward trend in the years after the acquisition. In order for to identify the poor 
quality of accounting earnings as the determinant of glamour acquirers underperformance 
of value acquirers, it is necessary for the trend of mean glamour residual income to follow 
the opposite trend of glamour earnings (proxied by NOPAT and net income). The rationale 
behind condition is that if the quality of earnings is bolstered by excess investments, the 
cost of capital of those investments will decrease residual income (or organic income) even 
if net income and NOPAT are growing. Thus the residual income of glamour acquirers should 
be lower on average than value acquirers and it should exhibit a decreasing trend in the 
years leading up to the acquisition. Panel J and K show that none of these conditions are 
met by the data sample. Glamour residual income exhibits a slightly upwards trend in the 
year pre-acquisition and is on average larger than that of value acquirers for the entire 
period of the study. Thus, this study rejects the null hypothesis that the organic component 
(as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-acquisition earnings supports 
the claim that glamour acquirers pre-acquisition earnings are unsustainable. 
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  Panel J: Glamour Acquirer Summary 
  
Year Investments NOPAT 
Residual 
Income 
  
  Year + 3 7.21% 14.76% 10.15%   
  Year + 2 5.60% 15.11% 5.15%   
  Year + 1 4.29% 16.48% 5.07%   
  Year 0 6.13% 18.08% 8.07%   
  Year - 1 6.90% 19.07% 8.30%   
  Year - 2 5.05% 14.55% 4.53%   
  Year - 3 5.30% 12.66% 5.94%   
          Panel K: Value Acquirer Summary 
  
Year Investments NOPAT 
Residual 
Income 
  
  Year + 3 10.12% 10.25% 0.22%   
  Year + 2 12.36% 8.44% -1.27%   
  Year + 1 16.16% 9.28% 0.32%   
  Year 0 13.80% 11.38% 1.18%   
  Year - 1 12.49% 13.11% 3.94%   
  Year - 2 13.42% 17.66% -4.40%   
  Year - 3 11.73% 14.05% 2.19%   
 
4.3.3 The Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirers 
Ho: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the 
abnormal stock performance of the glamour acquirer post-acquisition. 
Ha: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline does not affect 
the abnormal stock performance of the glamour acquirer post-acquisition. 
Table 2 below presents the output of the long run post acquisition performance of glamour 
and value acquirers. Panel A presents the raw and abnormal BHR for value and glamour 
acquirers in Year -1. Glamour raw BHR in Year -1 is 35.95% and glamour BHR abnormal 
returns above the JSE All Share index is 12.73%. In contrast value acquirers underperform 
glamour acquirers in that year with value raw BHR in Year -1 of 16.28% and value BHR 
abnormal returns above the JSE All Share index of 4.15%.  
Panel B presents the raw and abnormal BHR for value and glamour acquirers in Year +1. 
Glamour raw BHR in Year +1 is 16.05% and glamour BHR abnormal returns above the JSE All 
Share index is -3.62 %. In contrast value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers in that year 
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with value raw BHR in Year +1 of 23.99% and value BHR abnormal returns above the JSE All 
Share index of 2.54% 
Panel C and D similarly show that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers with 
respect to raw returns and abnormal returns in Year +2 and Year +3. Glamour raw BHR in 
Year +2 (Year +3) is 15.96% (11.12%) and glamour BHR abnormal returns above the JSE All 
Share index is -1.09% (-4.41%). Value raw BHR in Year +2 (Year +3) is 24.61% (20.56%) and 
value BHR abnormal returns above the JSE All Share index is 3.57% (1.67%). 
The result show that glamour acquirers experience a significantly greater price run-up in the 
year prior to acquisitions, relative to value acquirers, followed by a more substantial drop in 
each of the three post-acquisition years. This indicates that market participant do not factor 
the future reversal of earnings momentum into their estimates of glamour stock prices and 
are thus shocked when reversal happens post-acquisition, thus the steeper decline in stock 
prices. Thus this study accepts the null hypothesis that earnings momentum prior to 
acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the abnormal stock performance of the glamour 
acquirer post-acquisition. 
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Table 2: Long-Run Performance 
    
Panel A: BHR (Year - 1) 
 
    Raw JSE All Share   
  Value 16.28% 4.15%   
  Glamour 35.95% 12.73%   
  t-value -2.038 -0.784   
  t-critical 1.989 1.985   
    
 
 
  
    
Panel B: BHR (Year + 1) 
 
    Raw JSE All Share   
  Value 23.99% 2.54%   
  Glamour 16.05% -3.62%   
  t-value 0.585 0.458   
  t-critical 1.997 1.998   
    
 
 
  
    
Panel C: BHR (Year + 2) 
 
    Raw JSE All Share   
  Value 24.61% 3.57%   
  Glamour 15.96% -1.09%   
  t-value -0.511 0.266   
  t-critical 1.993 1.993   
    
 
 
  
    
Panel D: BHR (Year + 3) 
 
    Raw JSE All Share   
  Value 20.56% 1.67%   
  Glamour 11.12% -4.41%   
  t-value 1.036 -0.847   
  t-critical 1.991 1.997   
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CHAPTER 5 – Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the conclusions and recommendations of this study.  The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents a discussion on the link between the findings in 
this study and other studies. Section 5.3 provides the conclusions derived from this study. 
Section 5.4 gives insight into further study. 
5.2 Discussion 
This paper contributes to the literature on earnings momentum surrounding major 
corporate events and the literature on earnings management and extends it to the South 
African M&A environment. Following Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Sudarsanam, Mahate and 
Freedman (2001) and Zhu (2008) this study finds that value acquirers outperform glamour 
acquirers in the long-run post acquisition.  This study attempts to identify the poor quality of 
accounting earnings as the cause of this underperformance as Georgopoulos, Koumanakos 
and Siriopoulos (2005) and Zhu (2008) find. This study, however, cannot comprehensively 
prove that poor quality of accounting earnings contributes to the underperformance of 
glamour acquirers (relative to value acquirers) in the South African market. 
5.3. Conclusion 
Research on post-acquisition underperformance of glamour acquirers relative to value 
acquirers has not frequently posited the accounting quality of earnings as a cause.  Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) attribute this anomaly to the performance extrapolation hypothesis while 
Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001) sight market over reaction as the cause. 
However, Zhu (2008) highlighted poor quality of accounting earnings as a possible cause. 
Using a sample of 797 South African acquisitions over the period of 2001 to 2009, this study 
has found that value acquirers have outperformed glamour acquirer post-acquisition. It is 
also found that glamour acquirers have displayed a trend of an increase in earnings in the 
three years prior to acquisitions and a decline in earnings in the three years post-acquisition. 
Borrowing from Zhu (2008) this paper sought to explain this earnings trend using an analysis 
of residual income and earnings of glamour acquirers. The analysis of the data however 
proved inconclusive in proving that the pre-acquisition earnings momentum of glamour 
acquirers is in part bolstered by their aggressive investments. The study also finds that 
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market participant do not anticipate the future reversal of earnings momentum into their 
estimates of glamour stock prices and are thus shocked when reversal happens post-
acquisition.  
The following summarises the result of the three hypothesis tests as stated in the results 
section: 
5.3.1 The Earnings Momentum around M&A Transactions 
Ho: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibits an upwards trend, 
peaking just before the acquisition and then exhibits a downward trend in the years after 
the acquisition. 
Ha: Glamour acquirers’ earnings (relative to Value acquirers) exhibit no trend. 
Result: Ho  is accepted  
 5.3.2 The Quality of Earnings Momentum of Acquirers 
Ho: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings supports the claim that glamour acquirers pre-acquisition earnings are 
unsustainable. 
Ha: The organic component (as measured by residual income) of glamour acquirers’ pre-
acquisition earnings does not give any indication of the sustainability of glamour acquirers 
pre-acquisition earnings. 
Result: Ho  is rejected 
5.3.3 The Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquirers 
Ho: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline affects the 
abnormal stock performance of the glamour acquirer post-acquisition. 
Ha: The earnings momentum prior to acquisitions and subsequent decline does not affect 
the abnormal stock performance of the glamour acquirer post-acquisition. 
Result: Ho  is accepted 
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5.4 Further Research 
Further research could identify the possible causes of the relative post-acquisition 
underperformance of South African glamour acquirer in the long run. Other proxies for 
accounting quality of earning could possibly be used for this purpose. For instance, Zhu 
(2008) use accrual persistence and shifting core expenses as alternative measures of 
accounting quality. Other theories that could be tested in the South African context include 
the performance extrapolation hypothesis as tested by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and 
market over reaction as tested by Sudarsanam, Mahate and Freedman (2001)  
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